








Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Zhu, D. (2001). Inequality, Credit Market Imperfection, Segmentation and Economic Growth. (CentER
Discussion Paper; Vol. 2001-58). Macroeconomics.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
No. 2001-58
INEQUALITY, CREDIT MARKET IMPERFECTION,




Inequality, Credit Market Imperfection,
Segmentation, and Economic Growth
Dantao Zhu¤
CentER, Tilburg University & Peking University of China
August 21, 2001
Abstract
This paper investigates how initial inequality can causally a¤ect economic
growth when moral hazard problems exist in credit markets. Two regimes of
the credit markets aiming at overcoming the moral hazard problems are ana-
lyzed. The formal one such as bank relies on intermediary between borrowers
and lenders by asking for collateral. The informal one relies on direct yet
costly monitoring by the lenders themselves. However, from the social point
of view both of them are unfavorable to certain segments of the agents in this
heterogenous economy in terms of whether the individual potential productiv-
ity could be fully realized. Consequently, the permission of the coexistence of
these two regimes could be growth enhancing. The dynamic rise and fall of
the formal and informal regimes are implied along the growth process of per
capita income. In the empirical part, the negative relationship between initial
inequality and long run growth is discovered, using cross-province data in rural
China rather than more often used cross-country data sets in literature. In-
terestingly, the policy dummy variable telling the permission or forbidding of
the informal regime presents a positive sign. Both of these two results support
our theoretical model empirically. Finally, we argue that this channel to bridge
inequality and economic growth is more rural speci…c.
Keywords: inequality, formal and informal credit markets, moral hazard,
economic growth
JEL classi…cation: E44, O16, O17
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1 Introduction
The Kuznets hypothesis tells us about dynamic changes of income distribution along
the industrialization process. Basically, the Kuznets curve answers the question how
development can in‡uence distribution. Other related literature examines this di-
rection of causality as well. However, this is only one side of the coin. The recent
concerns start increasingly to look at the reverse direction of the causality, trying to
answer how distribution can a¤ect development and growth.
In this line of literature, there is already a traditional opinion that inequality is
good for growth1. But at the same time, especially in the recent time, there has been
a large increase in reconsiderations on this relationship challenging the conventional
wisdom. From the theoretical aspect, many models construct the negative relation-
ship between inequality and growth in the background of democratic and developed
societies. From the empirical aspect, more and more evidences have been discovered,
showing this negative relationship as well mostly by using the cross country data
sets. In this paper, we are mainly motivated to add to these new reconsiderations
both from the empirical side and from the theoretical side. Instead, not only is our
theoretical model more suitable to be served as a rural model for developing countries
and the political system does not play a role in this model, but also our empirical
working data are from a cross section data set within one particular country.
According to neo-classical theory, the perfect capital or credit market is important
in growth-enhancing. However, in many developing countries, especially in rural
areas in developing countries, it is likely to observe imperfect credit markets. How
important are these for growth?
”The plot questionnaire does ask whether a given household would be
willing to borrow more(presumably at prevailing interest rates) to …nance
labor, fertilizer, or herbicide; that is, would pro…ts be increased? Here
eight out of twelve farmers in Yang Pieng say yes, they are ”credit con-
strained”; three say that they fear debt; two say that they are not brave
enough to take the risk; two cite that no place to borrow or lack of
money;...”(Townsend ,1995).
”In rural credit market, high default rates have prevented the institutions
from being self-…nancing: recurrent and often large injections of govern-
ment funds have been required. And despite these subsidies, many of
these credit programs have had little success in reaching farmers without
collateral or with below-average income.” (Ho¤ and Stigltz, 1990).
1There are several main arguments underlying this idea. One is the incentive consideration: if the
actions undertaken by agents are unobservable, the equal distribution will obviously discourage them
from making any e¤ort. Other considerations such as investment indivisibility and the trick-down
theory strengthen this argument.
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These quotations express implicitly that the insu¢ciency of the rural credit market
has di¤erent impacts on individuals with di¤erent levels of income. It seems that if
the dispersion of income distribution across individuals increase, this impacts could
be ampli…ed. Motivated by the frequent observations such as the under-development
of the rural credit market and increasing inequality in some developing countries, we
try to answer in this paper how inequality can have negative e¤ects on growth if the
credit markets are imperfect.
One particular consequence (we believe) of the rural credit market imperfection is
the prevalence of the so called informal credit markets in rural developing countries.
It is interesting to have noticed that most policy makers are simply against this kind
way of rural …nancing and manage to take all kinds of measures to eradicate and
forbid them. But reality shows that it is really not easy to e¤ectively enforce these
policy measures. For example, in Zhejiang province of China, the rural informal
credit market will emerge again sooner after the policy makers …nish their last …ght
with it and start to overlook it. Motivated by this puzzling fact, in this paper we
try to uncover this puzzle and evaluate the existing policy toward the informal credit
markets in rural developing areas.
In the theoretical part of this paper, as mentioned above, our framework features
imperfect credit markets and credit markets segmentation as the reason to explain
the negative relationship between initial inequality and growth. The key argument is
as follows. The agents di¤er in term of initial income. They have access to the credit
markets to borrow or lend in order to undertake the optimal investment level, but
the credit markets are imperfect in the form of moral hazard. There are potentially
several di¤erent kinds of intermediaries’ technologies to overcome this imperfection.
One is from banks, this kind of intermediary o¢cially exists and uses monitoring
technologies within the framework of the law or o¢cial documents. If we can call this
intermediary as formal one and think it more or less exogenously given, the second
kind of intermediary is more informal and emerges endogenously, i.e. if only formal
credit market exists, there must be some agents distinguished by the initial income
having incentives to promote the formation of the informal credit markets. It is not
surprising that these informal markets have certain features to satisfy the demand of
these deviators. The e¤ect of the initial income distribution on the segmentation of
the credit markets is clear. Then under other assumptions, the income distributions
will have clear e¤ect on growth. One of the assumptions is the diminishing returns
to investment. Others will rely on the parameters for this economy.
In the empirical part of this paper, we use cross-province data in one country
(rural data in China) instead of mostly often used cross-country data to check the
relationship between initial inequality and growth. The advantage of one-country
-cross-region data analysis is that it avoids the institutional and geographical distur-
bances that are inherently unavoidable when conducting cross-country data regres-
sions. The robust negative relationship is still pinned down. So this particular one
country case study adds to the existing empirical evidence because of this advan-
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tage. Moreover, the policy dummy variable telling the permission or forbidding of
the informal regime presents a positive sign.
Two important things are mentioned at the beginning. One is that we believe this
particular model is more rural speci…c because many of the features in this model are
derived from the stylized facts in rural areas. This rural speci…c model will just match
the empirical …ndings also from rural areas in this paper. The other one is a little bit
departure from the current debate on this relationship. Many of the models that aim
at proving the negative relationship between inequality and growth are based on the
relatively larger inequality. Instead, the aim of this model is to show that within the
context of a particular theoretical framework inequality always has a negative e¤ect
on growth, no matter the degree of inequality is large or small.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we …rstly make a short literature
review focusing on recent modelling reconsiderations. Then we address our particular
model both for the static equilibrium and for the dynamic extensions. We also argue
why our model is more rural speci…c. Moreover we emphasis the second feature of
this model without further elaboration: in this model inequality always has a negative
e¤ect on growth no matter the degree of inequality is large or small. In section 3,
the empirical evidences are presented, drawing cross section data from rural China.
In Section 4 we shows there are some issues more on the agenda and draws some
conclusions.
2 The Model
2.1 Theoretical Literature Review
Before presenting our model, we will survey the currently existing theoretical litera-
ture focusing on the negative relationship between these two critical macroeconomic
variables. We roughly divide them according to the following perspectives, respec-
tively.
Political economy approach Basically, this approach adds to a political twist to
the economic rationale of the …rst best. This approach is associated with work by
Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Benabou (1996), as well as others. The main idea
is that by lowering the income of the median voter or middle class relative to the
national average, greater inequality increases the pressure for redistribution. This,
in turn, discourages investment. In the political-economic equilibrium (Persson and
Tabellini), if the median voter coincides with the average investor, he prefers to a
non-redistributive policy, whereas he prefers to a tax (a subsidy) on investment if he
is poorer (richer) than the average. Then distortions happen.
Neo-classical approach This approach embodies more economically based consid-
erations. E¢ciency, as well as economic growth, is una¤ected by the initial distribu-
tion, if we assume convex preferences and production, and perfect information. In the
absence of such nice assumptions, of course, e¢ciency may well be a¤ected. Firstly,
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let us drop the assumption of the perfect information. Most frequently, one of the re-
sults from the imperfect information is the existence of the imperfect capital markets.
At this moment,we simply check this mechanism by closing down the capital market.
This is the extreme case studied by Aghion (1998). Now the poor people have no
access to the capital market at all. Consequently they can’t undertake the optimal
investment level constrained by the initial wealth they have. This situation combined
with the decreasing return to the marginal product will lead to a lower overall growth
rate. This idea is just underlying what we will focus on in the next section. But there
we will examine some more speci…c capital market imperfections besides this extreme
case. Secondly, we can drop the assumption of convexity of the production function
by asking for a …xed initial capital outlay in the “entrepreneurial” activity. This is
one feature of Aghion and Bolton’s paper (1997). This minimal investment require-
ment will make the poorer agents not be able to borrow, even if they want to borrow.
What they can do now is to rely on the “backyard” activity because this activity
requires no capital investment. As a result, the income distribution matters for the
growth.
Social con‡ict approach This approach is based on the idea that the social con-
‡ict reduces the security of property rights, thereby discouraging accumulation. In
particular, when the gap between rich and poor widens, the latter presumably have
a greater temptation to engage in rent-seeking or predatory activities at the expense
of the former. In Benabou (1996), he used a simple growth version of the prisoner’s
dilemma that captures the essence of this class of models. In his paper, the econ-
omy’s maximum sustainable growth rate is shown to be negatively related to interest
groups’ rent-seeking abilities, as well as to income disparities between them. It may
be pro…table for the rich to collectively transfer wealth to the poor through land
reform, education subsidies, and trade protection. Moreover, we can think of this
approach in the following way. A poor man has little to lose if caught thieving, re-
ducing inequalities though redistribution helps to reduce envy and crime and again
simulates investment and growth.
Demand side approach The above summarized approaches are built on the theories
that more or less focus on the supply side, there are also some papers trying to
relate the income distribution with economic growth to the demand factors. The
…rst example of this approach (Falkinger and Zweimuller, 1997) is the hierarchical
structure of the consumer demand due to the di¤erent level of income. Engel’s law
states that the di¤erent categories of consumption do not expand proportionally with
income. First the relatively more basic needs are satis…ed. Then, as people get
richer, demand turns to new goods. So the distribution of income determines the
demand structure and the product diversity, therefore a¤ects economic growth. The
assumption of a positive relationship between product diversity and productivity
implies that the long -run growth rate of an economy should be positively correlated
with an unequal distribution of incomes. In their paper, they contrast this standard
assumption, according to which productivity is not determined by product diversity
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but by other factors, related to the nutrition of the work force, the infrastructure,
or the degree of urbanization. With these alternative assumptions their model leads
to the conclusion that growth rates should be negatively correlated with inequality.
The second example (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) is that the distribution of
income is of importance to industrialization, since the middle class are the natural
consumers of manufactured goods. Extreme concentration of wealth in the hand
of very rich will manifest itself in the demand for handmade and imported luxuries
rather than for domestic manufactures. So this unequal distribution will slow down
the industrialization and the economic growth.
2.2 Key Ingredients of the Model
There are several stylized facts in rural areas of developing countries. The key ingre-
dients and structure of our model are actually derived from these stylized facts. That
is why we think this model is more rural speci…c. We …rstly present these stylized
facts and then explain how we incorporate them one by one into our model.
² Agricultural activities are more likely to exhibit diminishing marginal returns;
² The rural production activities need less set-up cost compared with the urban
ones;
² Asymmetric information in credit markets is prevailing in the spatially large
countryside; banks have di¢culties to monitor the activities undertaken by
borrowers, so collateral asked by banks are popular; at the same time, the
informal credit market is often prevalent in rural areas2 ;
² The rural household is a consumption unit, also a production unit.
In the pioneering investigation at Northern Thai villages by Townsend (1995),
his fundamental basis for theoretical inference is decreasing returns to capital invest-
ment. He argues that agricultural production activities have the nature of diminishing
marginal return to capital prominently. In our model, diminishing return to capital
investment is the central assumption as well. Our basic story is as follows. Diminish-
ing marginal returns to capital input means that at low investment levels marginal
returns are high. In other words, from the social optimal point of view, the production
gain from one additional unit of investment by the poor will su¢ciently compensate
(maybe more than) the production loss from the one unit decrease of investment
by the rich. However, if credit constraints prevent the agents from smoothing their
2Examples of informal and semi-informal institutions are:
(1). Peasent funding associations in China
(2). ”pawnshops” in Phillippine
(3). Rotating savings and credit associations (Tontines in Senegal, Key in Korea)
(4). Bishi in India (See Bouman, 1989, for intensive investigations)
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di¤erences of investment, inequality will have a negative e¤ect on growth. The pio-
neering idea on this topic started with Loury (1981). Recently are Benabou (1996)
and Aghion (1998).
Furthermore, it is also easily observed and understood that rural activities have
less set-up cost requirement compared with modern factories. Correspondingly, in
our model convexity of the production set is another key ingredient. If instead,
investment involves a minimum project size, generating a threshold level of wealth
below what agents do not invest, the poor will be excluded from investment because of
this banner. Then probably wealth concentration could be growth enhancing, which
means inequality could have a positive e¤ect on growth. Anyhow, what we want
to focus on here is the credit constraints instead of the minimum sunk constraints.
Non-convexity is the assumption in Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Galor and Zeira
(1993). As pointed by Benabou(1996), in these models the e¤ects of inequality on
growth depend critically on the initial distribution. Furthermore, non-convexity is
also originally seen as a key ingredient in models with explicit credit rationing. In
this paper, there is no credit rationing analyzed.
As far as the rural credit markets are concerned, many pioneering works describe
them in a similar way. Many of them argue (see Ho¤ and Stiglitz, 1990) that banks in
rural areas have found it di¢cult to screen and monitor borrowers directly and thereby
rely heavily on collateral.3 Informal intermediaries are also popular in the rural areas
and their interest rates charged on the borrowers are higher than the formal credit
market interest rates. Bouman (1989) argues that the prevalence of the informal
credit market is the self-response for the ”penny” rural economy. Correspondingly,
both asymmetric information in credit markets and the coexistence and segmentation
of ”formal”and ”informal”credit markets are two ingredients in our model. There
are many ways to model the imperfections of credit markets. In this paper, we
will focus on the asymmetric information taking the form of moral hazard. This
simpli…cation makes the co-existence of formal and informal credit markets easily
tractable. There is no interest rate spread in the formal credit market. This spread
is the key element to the job choices between the poor and the rich (Galor and
Zeira, 1993). Moreover, we try to model the coexistence of the informal and formal
credit markets. Given the characteristics of the informal and formal credit markets
respectively, the emergence of the informal credit market is somewhat self-responsing
in our model. The modelling researches on the informal credit market are scarce,
many of which are more descriptive although very instructive, such as Bouman (1989).
Lastly, our model is household-production-activity based, which is in line with
the last stylized fact in rural areas. But why the rural households don’t use their
capital together? The diminishing returns can basically give answers. Townsend
(1995) provides evidences of the decreasing returns which are central on the resulting
3In Stiglitz’s paper, land is the main form of collateral in Tailand, ”the sphere of operation of
commercial banks and cooperatives... has been almost exclusively in the villages where land titles
have been issued”.
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ine¢ciency: both in developing and developed rural areas the household is usually
the most e¢cient unit of production. Similarly, another question arises: why can’t
one household hire the labor of other households? There are many justi…cations
for this simpli…cation. The problem of labor contract enforcement in rural areas,
the particular di¢culties in monitoring between principal and agent in agricultural
activities, the far distance between households are amongst them. Although their
production and consumption are separated in terms of the possibility to pool labor
and capital input together, there is still one connecting point across the individual
households: the credit market, if they can have access to it.
It is easily understood that other models reviewed in 2.1. are less rural speci…c, or
only more or less rural related. Perhaps the most rural related model is the demand
side approach by Murphy et.al. (1989). They use their model at the country level,
predicting that higher inequality will lure the rich to buy imported luxuries instead
of domestic goods. We can borrow their ideas to the rural-urban study, which means
that high inequality in rural areas will lure the rich in rural areas to rely more on
imported goods from the urban areas4. This will lead to less growth in the rural
areas.
2.3 Environment
2.3.1 In Period t Household Behavior Description
In this economy there is only one good, which can be for either consumption or in-
vestment. There is a continuum of non-altruistic overlapping generations households,
indexed by i 2 [0; 1]: Each member i lives in two sub-periods in period t. When young,
she consumes cit
5 and has to invest the amount kit to obtain consumption when old.
Consumption and investment is …nanced by each household’s initially exogenously




t ¸ 0 means borrowing). When old, the
production is realized and she consumes at the amount dit and makes repayment on
her loan in the case of bit > 0, or receive the interest rate repayment in the case of
bit < 0: The household does not care about her children, so no bequests are left. The
households have identical preferences and intertemporal utility at time t is given by
U it = ln c
i
t + ½ ¢ ln dit (1)
,where ½ is the discount factor.
4They also can buy imported goods from the rest of world.
5Because this paper focus on the one-period relationship between distribution and growth, all of
the economic behavior within this period will be analyzed, including consumption. This is unlike
other papers, such as Galor and Zeira (1993), in which only in second sub-period will the individ-
uals consume. Their simpli…cation is necessary to pin down the dynamic interaction between the
distribution and growth in the long run.
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2.3.2 Technology





where s is constant and bigger than one, yt¡1 is the average production level pro-
duced in the previous period and kit is the household speci…c investment level. This
production function assumes that each household incorporates a common factor, i.e.
the average production level of the previous period, as one production factor . We
can understand this assumption as a spill-over e¤ect between two consecutive peri-
ods or think that the previous production fruit will become the common production
conditions for the current period. We call this a ”scale e¤ect”. As usual, s could
be regarded as ”technology e¤ect”, which is held constant over time. The reasons
why we put these two e¤ects into the household production function will be further
elaborated in the dynamic section of this paper.
We introduce the individual’s production options and uncertainty as follows.
There is no aggregate risk. However, each household’s technology is subject to moral
hazard like in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). An household can choose between two
projects: the less risky project and the more risky one. However, the more risky
project o¤ers a private bene…t µ to the borrower: this is the source of moral hazard
because the borrower has incentives to engage in the more risky activity that is unde-
sirable from the lender’s point of view. We depart from Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)





®y1¡®t¡1 with probability p





®[y1¡®t¡1 + µ] with probability q
0 with probability 1¡ q
Because all investment projects are identical there is no adverse selection in this
economy. Only incentive issues are necessary to be considered. p > q is the necessary
condition to establish moral hazards.
2.3.3 Inequality Index
We introduce inequality simply by assuming that the households di¤er only in their
exogenously given initial endowments
6This assumption avoids considering incentive and risk diversi…cation together in the case of risk




t ¢ yt¡1 (3)
"it is an identically and independently distributed random shock that measures i’s
access to the previous output. We normalize the mean of "i at one, such that
Z 1
0
witdi = yt¡1 (4)
We consider the initial endowment as exogenously determined in the sense that yt¡1
is predetermined and the realized distribution of "it is also given.
2.4 Two Extremely Simple Case Studies
Till the section for dynamic extensions, we will omit s in production function and
subscript t, both of which are dynamically related. We denote the previous produc-
tion outcome as y¡1: Under the set-up established above, the relationship between
distribution and growth can be analyzed. Before doing so, we can get a …rst intuition
of this relationship from the basic set-up only.





Because ® < 1;the function ( ki)® is concave. For a given aggregate capital stock, a
greater dispersion of individuals’ investment will reduce the aggregate output. Here






The borrower prefers to the less risky project when self-…nances. This means that
we restrict our attention in this section on the periods thereafter ¹y; which stands for






In Figure 1 we present assumption (1) graphically. Since assumption (1) tells us that
in the case of complete self …nance the good project will generate more second period
consumption than the bad one, correspondingly in this …gure, on the vertical line
the good project’s consumption point lies above the point from the bad one. If the
growth rate of this economy is positive, the initial penny economy will eventually
reach the critical value ¹y at a certain time.
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2.4.1 The Perfect Capital Market Case
It is well known that the assumption of a perfect capital market is the key one in
the Ramsey model. The perfect capital market means there are no transaction and
information cost, so there is a single interest rate (no interest rate spread) and indi-
viduals’ lending and borrowing face no constraint. Furthermore, this means that any
kind of intermediary can monitor the projects undertaken by the borrowers perfectly
and costlessly. This perfect monitor will force the borrowers to take on the less risky
project. As far as the lenders, they will also take the less risky project by assumption
(1). Now the perfect capital market will only result in the less risky project to be un-
dertaken. The following has been proved by Ahgion et.al. (1998) (also see appendix
for proof).
Proposition 1 If the capital market is perfect, all individuals end up investing the
same amount of capital goods ki ´ k no matter what the initial distribution of previous
production output across individuals.
This proposition basically means that @k
i
@wi
= 0 and @b
i
@wi
< 0. These results have
straightforward meanings. Investment is the same across individuals. The poorer
is, the more borrowing will be. The wealthier with wi > y¡1 are lender and the
wealthier is, the more lending will be. We know that in this ideal case, the perfect
capital market plays a key role to equalize the investment between the poor and the













which is independent on initial wealth distribution.
2.4.2 The Case of Closing Down the Capital Market
Closing down the capital market means that there is no borrowing and lending at
all, even the agents have more or less incentives to do so. For example, this can
happen if there is no way to enforce repayment. In this case, the agents have to
self-…nance their investment, so all of them will prefer choosing the less risky project
(by assumption (1)).
Proposition 2 If there is no capital market at all, equilibrium investment will remain
unequal across individuals corresponding to the unequal initial wealth distribution. Not
only will the distribution matters, but also the more unequal distribution is, the less
growth rate will be.
The interaction between diminishing marginal capital production and closing





















Recall equation 3, "i can be viewed as the inequality index. Because ® < 1; ("i)® is a
concave function. It is easy to understand that the more dispersed "i about 1; the less
the growth rate will be. Without the capital market, inequality under-uses the poor’s
productivity, whereas over-using the rich’s one, from the social optimal point of view.
To show this, we will compare this case with the perfect capital market case because
the perfect capital market case can be thought as the social optimal case7. From
eq. 22 and 25 in appendix, the poorer is, the even lower investment compared with
the perfect capital market case, whereas the richer undertakes the higher investment
compared with the perfect capital market case. The change of these two cases are
only neutral to the household possessing the mean initial endowment.
2.5 ”Formal” and ”Informal”Credit Markets
The above analyses are simple and extreme. In fact, the more common cases are
the regimes of credit markets with imperfections, which are in between of these two




®p(ki)®¡1y1¡®¡1 ¡ r < ®q[y1¡®¡1 + µ](ki)®¡1 ¡
qr
p
The borrower prefers to the more risky one whenever obtaining the loan from the
bank. For the sake of notational simplicity, we denote Fg = p(ki)®y1¡®¡1 and Fb =
q(ki)®[y1¡®¡1 + µ] as the expected output undertaking the less risky project and more
risky project respectively8. Then this assumption means
F
0





In Figure 1 we also show assumption (2) graphically, with the good project’s con-
sumption line less steeper than the bad ones.
2.5.1 Regime 1: Separate “Formal” Credit Market With Moral Hazard
We will …rstly characterize one kind of technologies to overcome moral hazard by
the so-called formal credit market. Banks are the main institutions in this formal
market. By the two possible choices of projects and the assumptions (1) and (2),
the borrowers always have incentives to undertake the more risky project whenever
they are externally …nanced. But here we assume that banks can’t monitor at all.
What they can do is to ask for collateral from the borrowers to serve as an incentive
7So the center planner can redistribute wi; such that "i = 1 for all i: The redistribution policy
has the substituting function for the prefect capital market.
8The subscripts in F stand for ”good” and ”bad”, from the bank’s point of view.
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mechanism because the risk of losing collateral enforces the selection of less risky
project. The competitive banks will require r
p
from the borrowers, where r is the
interest repayment rate to the lenders
Proposition 3 Under the framework described in this subsection, there exists a crit-
ical wealth level ¹w; such that if wi ¸ ¹w, individual i is a lender otherwise i is a
borrower. In equilibrium, lenders choose the same investment level ¹k, while borrow-
ers have di¤erent investment levels corresponding to their wealth levels.
The Problem now is:
max
bi;ki











Equation 9 is the incentive compatibility constraint to prevent undertaking the more
risky project. The complete proof of this proposition is in the appendix.
The following propositions describe the behavior of the rich and the poor sepa-
rately in the equilibrium.












There is no surprise that the richer, the more lending will be (bi < 0): For the
individuals with wi < ¹w; the less poorer makes more investment. This investment is
partly …nanced by borrowing. One interesting result is that the less poorer has more
loan borrowed. The reasonable explanation is that the less poorer has more wealth
to serve as collateral in this asymmetric information credit market. Banks are willing
to grant more loan to the relatively wealthier borrowers. At this moment, we arrive
at an unfortunate situation: although the even poorer individuals have even higher
marginal product of capital rate which makes sense to grant them more loans from
the social optimal point of view, they have even lower ability to get access to the
credit market. This situation will be most exacerbated for the poorest.
Lemma 5 The critical initial wealth level ¹w is a function, ¹w = w(y¡1; p; q; µ): @ ¹w@y¡1 >
0; @ ¹w
@p
> 0; @ ¹w
@q
< 0; @ ¹w
@µ
< 0:
In this lemma, we state that this critical value is an increasing function of p; a
decreasing function of q and µ. From Figure 2 the imperfection of credit market makes
the critical value ¹w move to the left of the mean wealth level y¡1; this situation comes
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from the imperfection of the credit market. This shift means some of the borrowers
playing in the perfect credit market case change their roles into lenders. The more of
this imperfection (higher µ; lower di¤erence between p and q), the more such kind of
former borrowers will prefer changing into lenders, i.e., the more leftward movement
of this critical value. What’s more, the relationship between this critical value and
the initial total endowment is positive.
Figure 2 in the appendix compares this situation with the perfect market case,
too. When the credit market is imperfect, the total loans granted will be lower than
in the perfect credit market case, the interest rate will be higher. Consequently, the
investment level of the lenders will be lower in the imperfect credit market case than
in the perfect credit market case. So does the investment levels of the borrowers.
Proposition 6 Under the basic assumptions in this subsection, the more inequality
of the initial wealth distribution, the less growth rate in this period will be.



















it is not easy to show the conclusion straightforward because in this society the
equilibrium interest rate r (so the equilibrium ¹k) ,i( ¹w) and ki(for the individuals,
i < i( ¹w )) will depend on the inequality index "i. But the net e¤ect is clear:
the more dispersed wealth distribution, the more exacerbation of the accessibility to
obtain the desirable loan for the poor and the less utilization of their productivity.
Asking for collateral to prevent the borrower from moral hazard, the formal credit
market presents some undesirable equilibrium, especially for the poorer individuals.
2.5.2 Regime 2: Separate “Informal” Credit Market with Moral Hazard
We will now characterize the second kind of technologies to overcome moral hazard
by the so-called informal credit market. Obviously, classifying an institution as ”in-
formal” or ”formal” is to some extent an arbitrary choice. The aim is simply to o¤set
banks’ disadvantages in operating on the certain segments of the population lacking
collateral. To keep the model simple, we do not consider the risk diversi…cation role of
the informal market (Banks may allow better risk diversi…cation) and the interaction
between formal-informal sector (see Pinaki Bose 1998 for this consideration).
A special feature of the informal credit market is the intermediaries in this market
relying on a monitoring technology that solves the moral hazard problem rather than
on collateral. This is just opposite to the banks. However, this monitoring activity
is costly. Denoting C(l) as this cost if the loan size is l. By spending C(l); the
intermediary can drop the private bene…t µ down to zero. This means that if the
borrowers get loan from the informal credit market, they will undertake the less risky
project for sure. We assume C
0
(l) > 0; C 00(l) > 0: For simplicity, it takes the form
14






as payment rate for the lenders and borrowers in the informal credit
market. The relationship between these two rates is established under the assumption
of competitive informal intermediaries, so zero pro…t condition generates
pR
0
l = C(l) + pRl (12)







Some interesting results emerging due to the characterizing of the informal credit
market above.
Proposition 7 All of the lenders with li < 0 will end up at the same investment
level. The richer is, the more lending will be. The borrowers with li > 0 undertake








One exceptional result in this proposition is that the borrower will borrow less
if she or he is relatively rich. This is opposite to the result of proposition 4. The
reason is based on the assumption for C(l): Our assumption that monitoring cost is an
increasing quadratic function of the size of the loan makes the relatively rich borrowers
borrow less from the informal credit market. Figure 3 compares this situation with
the perfect market case. It is reasonable to claim that the more inequality is, the
more monitoring cost will be spent in this credit market and therefore the less growth
rate will be.
2.5.3 Regime 3: Co-existence of “Formal”and “Informal” Credit Market
In this subsection, we want to answer the following questions:
² Within the framework of the so called formal credit market regime described in
section 2.5.1, who have the more incentives or possibilities to deviate from this
existing formal …nancial market structure?
² Why are the basic characteristics of the emerging informal credit market de-
scribed in 2.5.2 suitable for these potential deviators?
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®p(ki)®¡1y1¡®¡1 > r (14)
for the individuals with wi < ¹w. By proposition 4, in the case of wi < ¹w, the even
poorer individual undertakes even less investment. So her or his marginal product of
capital will be even higher than the interest rate. If given one unit of the additional
loan, she or he will earn even more than the loan payment. So in the economy
described in 2.5.1, all the individuals with initial endowment wi < ¹w must be eager
to obtain more loan if possible. What’s more, the poorest individual’s eagerness is
the highest. So we expect that there will be some other kinds of credit markets
endogenously generated to meet their thirst. The poor is not able to get enough loan
from the existing formal credit market only because they don’t have correspondingly
enough collateral. This makes sense that the emerging informal credit market grants
loan not based on the collateral. In 2.5.2, we model the informal credit market’s way
to overcome moral hazard problem based on this logic.
If we allow that in this economy there are two kinds of intermediations’ tech-
nologies existing at the same time9, then we will arrive at the co-existence regime.
What is the impact of initial wealth distribution on this segmentation of the …nan-
cial market? Does this segmentation matter for growth? These are the questions we
want to answer in this section. It seems that for the relatively rich borrowers the
formal credit market is more attractive, whereas the informal credit market is more
attractive for the relatively poor borrowers. These preferences from the borrowing
side make the segmentation of the credit market possible. When making the decision
where to enter, the borrowers will compare their utility level from either of the two







for all borrowers. This is the necessary condition for existence of ŵ; which satis…es
that the individual prefers to informal credit market if wi < ŵ:
To realize it and complete our picture, we will analyze whether the lenders are
willing to act in the informal credit market and who will be more possible to enter into
it. Becoming a moneylender in the informal credit market is more risky compared to
save money in the banks. So we think that
pR = r (16)
9In fact, this is exactly the situations in many developing countries, especially in rural areas.
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is the necessary condition for their choosing informal credit market, otherwise nobody
will save money in the informal credit market. However, because we assume that
the individuals in this economy are risk-averse, this condition is not su¢cient for
entering. The further consideration is that the individuals’ utility in this economy
exhibits a decreasing absolute risk-aversion property10. This means that the wealthier
individuals accept risk more easily. So if
pR = r + Á (17)
where Á is strictly larger than zero, there must be individuals with higher wealth
wi > w who prefer to informal credit market. Á is endogenously determined in the
state of equilibrium..
Now the two credit markets will coexist. Before we describe the state of equilib-
rium, we give the de…nition of static equilibrium as follows.
De…nition 1 In this economy, all of the individuals and both kinds of intermediaries
will follow their own behavior rules: all the individuals choose the preferred credit
market and maximize their overall utility respectively. Both kinds of intermediaries
solve the moral hazard problem using their own mechanism and make zero pro…t
respectively.
In the formal credit market:
For borrowers: eq. 27, eq. 26 and their bounded constraint :Fg ¡p rpbi = Fb¡ q rpbi
For lenders: eq. 27 evaluated at °i = 0, eq. 26 evaluated at °i = 0
Formal credit market clearing condition: s wŵ bidi = 0
In the informal credit market:
For the borrowers: eq. 39, plus another FOC
For the lenders: eq. 37, plus another FOC
In formal credit market clearing condition: s ŵ¡1 bidi+ s+1w bidi = 0





Interest rate connection condition
pR = r + Á
All of these conditions will determine ki; bi(li as a di¤erent notation for the infor-
mal credit market); °i(for some i); r;R;R0; Á.
These conditions will generate the following equilibrium state:








a is a decreasing function of x:
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In the equilibrium, there are three critical values of wealth level, ŵ < ¹w < w:These
three values segment the individuals into four intervals.
(1). The relatively poorer among the borrowers get loan from the informal credit
market. The poorer is, the more borrowing will be.
(2). The relatively richer among the borrowers get loan from the formal credit
market. The richer is, the more loan available.
(3). The relatively poorer among the lenders grant credit into the formal credit
market. They have the same investment level, which makes the marginal capital
production equal to r:
(4). The relatively richer among the lenders grant credit into the informal credit
market. They have the same investment level, which makes the marginal capital
production equal to pR;i.e. r + Á:
Figure 4 shows how the individuals are segmented according to their income levels
and how the four segments of individuals meet each other in formal and informal credit
markets. Figure 5 roughly shows in the equilibrium state the borrowing(lending)
levels and investment levels across all of the poor and rich individuals.
The impact of this credit market segmentation on the growth rate is complex. On
the one hand, the informal credit market will waste some resources during the costly
monitoring activities. But on the other hand, it will make better use of the otherwise
underused productivity of the poorer borrowers that happened in regime 1. Which
e¤ects dominate will depend on the parameters in this economy.
2.6 Dynamic Extensions
Our model is a life cycle model, we can say, in the sense that it includes overlapping
generations of …nitely lived households (here two) who do not care about their de-
scendants. This is di¤erent from the dynastic model, in which agents live in…nitely
and care for their descendants as if they were the agents themselves. In the dynas-
tic model, the linkage between two generations are the bequests. The optimization
choice by household in time period t results in the bequests she or he leaves for the
next generation in time period t + 1. These intertemporal optimizations by all of
the households generate the evolution of the income distribution in this economy. In
fact, this bequest linkage is the key element in the endogenous evolution of income
distribution (for example, see Galor and Zeira, 1993). In our model, the sel…sh par-
ent households cut o¤ this possible dynamic evolution of income distribution. In the
following analyses, we make the following assumption.
Assumption (3):
At the beginning of each period, the distribution of realized "it is independent of
time t.
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Now the only linkage between two generations is the previous yt¡1 as the overall
initial endowment for the new generation in time period t: We can alternatively
understand this assumption, borrowing the ending-up equilibrium state in the Markov
transition process. Suppose there is a initial realized "i0 for all i, there is a constant
Markov transition matrix. One row of this matrix describes the probabilities of
the household i from a previous position to all possible new positions in the next
period. The matrix is constructed for all the individual households. After repeatedly
multiplied by this matrix, "i0 will eventually reach a equilibrium state, denoted by the
vector "it , then there is no change of the realization of the income distribution index
anymore.
Notice that even in the perfect credit market case, the constant growth rate is
negative11. So from now on we add ”technology e¤ect” s into the production function.
Whenever s > (1+½®
½®




2.6.1 Risky and Miserable Era before




The borrower prefers to the less risky project when merely self-…nancing. This
means that we restrict our attention on the one period static analysis from the period






What happens before? Here our …rst dynamic consideration is that the time
periods or era before the assumption (1) could be satis…ed. Our conclusion is that
this era is a miserable one in the sense that it is full of risk. In this era, even when
the household is self-…nanced completely, she or he will prefer the risky project12, and
let alone whenever she or he could obtain the external …nance. In fact, when
yt < ¹y:
assumption (2) will always hold, which means that in this era when she or he can get
external …nance, she or he will undertake the more risky project without doubt.
11Firstly, this is because we assume complete depreciation of capital input. Secondly, we can
understand this by this way: if we assume there is no consumption at all, this will result in constant
total production and there will be no growth(see eq. 6). In our model, part of the total production
is consumed, which will lead to negative growth rate.
12This is because the total size of the economy is so small compared to the private bene…t µ
generated from undertaking the more risky project. Here the ”scale e¤ect” matters.
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We can expect that in this era there will be no formal credit market because the
situation of full of risk makes the incentive compatibility constraint always violated.
We can see when Fg < Fb; the constraint 9 will always be violated. For the objective
to o¤er incentives making the borrowers choose the less risky project, the collateral
will become useless at all.
In this era, if we simply don’t permit the informal credit market to be operating,
this situation will be the case of closing down the credit market. Both no access to
the credit market and the pursuit of the more risky project make this era miserable.
Fortunately, because we assume that the growth rate in this economy is positive, this
economy can eventually realize transition from the risky choice to the less risky one,
and then satis…es the assumption (1). After the transition is realized, the formal
credit market can emerge and the economy is under the ”modern” way13.
Alternatively, in this era it is really possible that the informal credit market will
emerge. This is because this kind of intermediary can enforce the borrowers to under-
take the less risky project (by dropping the private bene…t µ down to zero) although
this monitoring activity is increasingly costly. Firstly, we can expect that this cost
is so high and e¤ectively wastes the resources in this economy and leads to a long
run zero growth rate. Then this economy will end up at this undesirable equilibrium,
something similar to ”poverty trap”. The higher unequal initial endowment distribu-
tion will more likely reach this trap. In this equilibrium there is no formal banking
at all. Under other conditions, for example, in such a situation that the monitoring
cost is not so high, we also can lead this economy eventually to the emergency of the
formal banking. Then we have the era of coexistence of formal and informal credit
markets.
2.6.2 Dynamics of the Coexistence of ”Formal? and ”Informal” Credit
markets Era After
Moreover, in the one period static analyses, we feature the static equilibrium as the
coexistence of the formal and informal intermediaries. The dynamic share change of
formal and informal credit markets along the growth of y (y has grown su¢ciently
above ¹y; after which the coexistence of two credit markets becomes possible) is an in-
teresting question to be addressed. Here we only give some intuitive analyses without
mathematically accurate proofs.
In equation 11 we assume that monitoring cost is an increasing quadratic function
w.r.s.t. the size of the loan. We also have the borrowing and lending interest rates
equation 13. This way to describe the informal credit market is somewhat in line
with the reality: the charged interest rates on borrowers in many informal rural
credit markets are the higher, the bigger of the loan sizes they get, since more cost
13As an intuitive understanding of this era, we look the India case. In the initial stage of economic
development (after independence), the share of the formal sector in total agricultural credit was very
low. In 1950-51 it was only 7%.
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need to be spent on monitoring for the bigger size of loan. As the economy grows
in terms of total production y; the loan size will increase accordingly. Then the
above feature of the informal credit market makes it even more costly. This means
that the informal credit market could become less and less attractive compared with
the formal counterpart along with the growth process. Consequently, the resulted
informal credit market share in each period over time could be decreasing. The rate
of the decreasing will depend on ¼ and the extent of inequality. High inequality will
retard this decreasing trend since high inequality makes the informal credit market
more needed. Of course, high ¼ will accelerate this decreasing trend since the informal
credit market is more costly.
We summarize the two eras analyzed above into Figure 6. Again policy makers
should have understood that the emergence of the informal credit market is somewhat
inherent and the growth process itself can shrink the share of the informal credit
market. In the stage of the natural coexistence of the formal and informal credit
markets, the simply hostile policy against informal credit market could be growth
reducing. Since the decreasing trend of the informal credit market will depend on
the degree of inequality, redistributive policy could be more preferable when policy
makers do want to decrease the informal credit market.
3 Empirical Evidence
A number of recent empirical results showing the negative relationship between ini-
tial inequality and economic growth were initiated from the puzzle raised by Lucas
(1993)14. Then more evidences were presented by Clarke (1993), and Persson and
Tabellini (1994). Benabou (1996) made an intensive and extensive review of these
…ndings. However, these existing empirical studies use cross country data unavoid-
ably to be involved into cultural, political and geographical disturbances, although
some of these studies try to control these disturbances, such as using geographical
dummy variables (Deininger and Spuire (1995)). Anyhow, if using the cross regional
data within a single country,we can still pin down the similar result, then these kinds
of disturbances can be avoided in some degree. This will be the main task of this
section. The similar consideration we have as cross-country growth regressions is ro-
bustness of the results. In this exercise, the sensitivity analysis will use reasonable
extreme bound analysis by Granger and Uhlig (1990). As a lost, we have to be more
cautious of spatial autocorrelation in cross-region regression. In this exercise, the La-
grange multiplier error dependence test is used. In addition, we introduce the dummy
14Lucas pointed out a fact. In 1960, the Philippines and South Korea had about the same standard
of living and a lot of similar initial conditions. Yet, From 1960 to 1988, GDP per capita in Philippines
grew at about 1.8 percent per year, whereas GDP per capita grew at 6.2 percent per year in Korea.
One proposed explanation on this huge di¤erence is the initial income distribution e¤ects. The
high initial inequality measured by many ways in Philippines is sharply opposite to the situation in
Korea.
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variable telling the di¤erent policy attitudes towards the informal credit market to
check whether we have empirical evidence that can …t the policy implications derived
from the modelling part of this paper.
3.1 Data Description
Most of the data are from the China State Statistical Bureau. The analyzed period
will start from 1988 and last till 1997. The cross-section data are drawn from 22
provinces, 3 municipalities (such as Beijing) and 4 autonomous regions (Tibet, al-
though as an autonomous region, is excluded due to missing data). The following
variables are introduced in this paper.
ANNUGROW: annual growth rate of rural household per capita net income from
1988 to 1997 in constant prices
GINI88: rural Gini coe¢cient in 1988 measured by Lorenz curve (by Zhu and
Wen, 1994)
INVEST: average investment to GDP ratio from 1988 to 1997
LABGROW: annual growth rate of rural labor from 1978 to 1987 ( the reason to
use ten years before is explained later)
EDUCA88: average received years of education by rural labor force in 1988
LNFIXCAP: log value of productive …xed assets per capita in 1988
EMPLOY88: ratio of employee in TVE15 (including part time employee) to the
total labor force in 1988
LNPOPU88: log amount of the total rural population in 1988
DUMMY: dummy is equal to 1, if the policy towards the informal rural credit
market is relatively friendly, or even supportive, or if there is no policy concerning
about informal rural credit market at all, or although having, the enforcement ability
is very poor; otherwise, dummy is equal to 0 if the policy attitude towards the informal
credit market is hostile and there are visible and e¤ective adverse impacts on the rural
informal credit markets(market) due to the policy.
GINI88 is our ’focus’ variable. INVEST and LABGROW are to explain the role
of di¤erent factor supplies, in line with the neoclassical approach. Here we use labor
growth rate ten years before in order to avoid the endogenity problem. Since saving
tendency is relatively exongenous and we measure INVEST by the ratio instead of
total volume, less endogenity problem of INVEST will occur. EDUCA88 is initial
human capital stock and LNFIXCAP is the initial physical capital stock instead. And
both stocks tell the degree of relative maturity or backwardness in addition to test
the hypothesis that a low starting point allows to catch up possibilities. EMPLOY88
has an approximate function to distinguish the strength of leading or lagging sectors.
LNPOPU88 is the indicator of the initial size of the economy that is expected to
relate to market size, degree of externalities and so on. DUMMY is another fucus
15TVE means Township and Village Enterprises.
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variable. If its sign is positive, then our model could to some extent be supported
empirically (see appendix for more detailed data statistic descriptions).
3.2 Basic Model
Before conducting the basic model, we will …rstly show a scatter-plot …gure of Gini88
and ANNUGROW to obtain …rst impression. From Figure 7 in the appendix, we can
get an impression of the negative relationship between initial income distribution and
growth in rural China across provinces.
Besides GINI88, we will use INVEST, LABGROW and EDUCA88 as the explana-
tory variables in the basic model. Table 1 is the result.
Table 1 Basic Model
Variables Coe¢cients Std. Error t-value
Constant 0.005 0.028 0.186
GINI88 -0.149 0.063 -2.349
INVEST 0.094 0.044 2.136
LABGROW 0.567 0.248 2.286
EDUCA88 0.012 0.004 3.002
F=5.332 P-value=0.002 R2=0.459
This result shows that all the included variables are signi…cant at 5% level (except
constant). GINI88 has negative e¤ects on growth after controlling three variables.
As we expect, education level and investment rate have signi…cant positive e¤ects on
long-run growth, so does labor supply. Because of only 29 cases, the …rst concern is
that one or two outlier may be driving the result. To show this is not the case, a
partial scatter of the residuals from growth and the Gini coe¢cient regressed on the
rest three variables is presented in Figure 8. This appears to con…rm that the result
is not driven by outliers. Another concern is heteroskedasticity. This hypothesis is
tested by using Breusch-Pagan test. The Ho hypotheses can’t be rejected at 5% level.
3.3 Full Model
3.3.1 Reasonable Extreme Bounds Analysis
Following the Barro-type growth model, recent empirical literature on economic
growth has identi…ed a substantial number of variables that are partially related
to the rate of economic growth. But one problem faced by empirical growth models
is that both the sign and signi…cance of the ’focus’ variable are sensitive to the in-
clusion, or exclusion of other explanatory variables(Sala-i-Martin, 1997 and Levine,
1992). This problem was initially suggested by Leamer (1983). To be understandable,
let us think of the following model:
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y = ¯IXI + ¯BXB + ¯pXp + u (18)
XI is the variable of interest, so does ¯I . XB is the vector of the variables which are
in some degree generally accepted by many econometric models. For example, they
could be the initial per capita GDP or initial human capital resource. Noticeably, Xp
is the subset of the variable pool. In this variable pool are the variables potentially
related to the dependent variable or less accepted variables. u is N(0; ¾2-). After
all of these three kinds of variables have been included, we arrive at the full model.
Model 18 is the general form of the full model. There is no surprise that the focus
coe¢cient ¯I will vary with respect to the change of the combinations of Xp:
An initial answer to this question was given by Leamer himself. He took the ex-
tremes taken by the alternative speci…cation as the ”extreme bounds”. The extent of
these bounds are viewed as measuring the fragility of the estimate of ¯I as alternative
speci…cations are used. However, one criticism of the use of extreme bounds is that
the actual extremes may come from models that most economists would …nd unrea-
sonable in some way. For a particular example, extremes could be obtained from the
speci…cation having a lower R2 value. This consideration lures us revisit the paper
by Granger and Uhlig (1990). In their original work, they enable the research with a
”continuum” of choice between classical econometrics and Leamer’s extreme bound
analyses. They restrict the range of reasonable speci…cations by restriction on R216
It is common known that the basic model will have the lowest R2 value due to
lest variables included, whereas the full model will generate the highest R2. It may
be thought that speci…cations that achieve R2 values not too far from R2maxwould
produce narrower extreme bounds for ¯I . They express the R
2 value achieved in a
certain speci…cation of this full model by
R2 = (1¡ ±)R2max + ±R2min (19)
Their restrictions on R2 will now rely on ± that means that for small ± these may be
considered as being ”reasonable” speci…cation because they are not far away from the
best ”full” model in terms of goodness-of-…t. The mentioned ”continuum” feature of
this approach is in the sense that we will return to the classical econometric principle
by setting ± = 0 and go to the extreme bounds by setting ± = 1:
3.3.2 The Full Model Setup
In order to set up the full model and conduct sensitivity analysis, we carefully choose
other 4 variables. All of them are relatively signi…cant and have di¤erent explanatory
angles. These four variables are as introduced before: LNFIXCAP, EMPLOY88,
LNPOPU88 and DUMMY. Now we arrive at the full model. Table 2 is the results.
16Granger and Uhlig don’t argue that R2 is an ideal measure of the quality of the model, but they
state that it is a possible relevant statistic and some exact results are achievable using it.
24
Table 2 Full Model
Variables Coe¢cient Std.Error t-value
Constant -0.221 0.077 2.870
GINI88 -0.173 0.076 2.276
INVEST 0.081 0.040 2.025
LABGROW 0.312 0.183 1.705
EDUCA88 0.007 0.003 2.290
LNFIXCAP 0.018 0.010 1.800
EMPLOY88 0.053 0.042 1.262
LNPOPU88 0.012 0.005 2.400
DUMMY 0.015 0.009 1.667
F = 6.700 Sig = 0.001 R2 = 0:802
From these results, we know that the basic four variables still have the same sign
and remain signi…cant at 10%. Although EMPLOY88 has small t values, it seems
that the tolerance level of this small sampling is higher. So we still leave them in
this full model. As the indicator of the initial capital stock per capita across regions,
LNFIXCAP has a positive e¤ect on the long-run growth. This result shows that in
the more matured areas measured by per capita …x assets will have higher growth.
Instead, if we regard this indicator as an approximate measurement of initial per
capita income, then we have divergence instead of convergence. Initial population
size presents a signi…cant positive e¤ects (e¤ect)on growth. Noticeably, the policy
dummy has positive sign. This means that in rural China for the period from 1988 till
1997 the informal credit market had some positive e¤ect on growth. In the provinces
with hostile policy against the informal credit market the growth would be lower,
holding other variables constant.
3.3.3 Spatial Autocorrelation
Before conducting the reasonable extreme bound analysis, we will check the validity
of the assumptions underlying the full regression model. Three things are important,
the normal distribution of residuals, homoskedasiticity and spatial autocorrelation.
From the histogram of residuals from the full model, we can approximately think
the residuals are normally distributed. Again we use Breusch-Pagan test to check
the H0 hypothesis of homoskedasticity and …nd that we can accept it. The third
consideration is spatial autocorrelation which (that)is considered to lie at the core of
the disciplines of regional science and geography.
Herewith we will use the very popular test, the Lagrange Multiplier Error Depen-
dence, in this exercise. For simplicity, we will use contiguity or connectivity matrix
as spatial weights matrix W. In this matrix, each observation is represented both
as a row and as a column. In each row, the nonzero column elements correspond to
contiguous regions. This simpli…cation only regards that the ”contiguous border” is
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important. Furthermore, we will sign the same weight to each region contiguous to a
considered region. Because of these two simpli…cations, the sum of each row of W is
1 and the nonzero elements in each row are equal. As a presentation, the …rst row of






0 0 ... ... 0)
Beijing has two contiguous provinces, Tianjing and Hebei, numbered as the second
and third observation, respectively. And both of these two continguous provinces
have been assigned the equal weights. The LM-ERR statistic is distributed as Â2
with one degree of freedom. The statistic value for the full model is 2.879, which is
smaller than the critical value at 5%. We will accept the H0 that there is no spatial
autocorrelation.
In summary, under the assumptions on the W matrix, the spatial autocorrelation
across the 29 regions in rural China is so low that it can be neglected. One possible
reason is the rural areas in each province are relatively independent. The restrict
regulation of residence registration over farmers makes the rural labor ‡ow more
di¢cult. In addition, the less development of the national capital markets makes the
capital ‡ow across regions less e¢cient.
3.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
This section employs the reasonable extreme bound analysis as the approach in sen-
sitivity analysis. This approach gives the extreme bounds of the coe¢cient of interest
subject to restricting R2 to be in the top certain percentage of the range of all the
possible R2, for example 10%. As a result, this will produce even narrower extreme
bounds for focus coe¢cient. In order to conduct it, the residual’s covariance matrix
¾2- is assumed to be known for the time being. Anyhow, the above results based
on the validity of the assumptions of homoskedasiticity of no spatial autocorrela-
tion make us approximate - = I. In addition, one might set ¾2= 1 to simplify the
calculation because the bounds do not depend on it. Table 3 is the result.
Table 3.Sensitivity Analysis on the Focus Coe¢cient of GINI88
± = 1:0 ± = 0:1 ± = 0:4 ± = 0:0
Upper -0.024 -0.087 -0.124 -0.173
Lower -0.313 -0.285 -0.203 -0.173
From this result, we know that the focus coe¢cient remains the same sign in the
restricted R2 ( at the top 10% level and top 40% level ) sensitivity analysis, as well as
the conventional unrestricted extreme bound analysis. These results con…rm a robust
and negative relationship between initial inequality and growth.
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4 Conclusions and Discussions
The conventional wisdom on the relationship between income distribution and growth
currently faces the challenges both from the theoretical aspect and from the empir-
ical aspect. This paper aims at constructing an additional rural speci…c model and
presenting additional country speci…c evidence to strengthen these challenges. Unlike
other models,whose challenges are based on the larger enough inequality, this model
always generates negative relationship between inequality and growth unless there is
asymmetric information in credit markets, no matter inequality is large or small. As
an unique feature, this model is more rural speci…c. In addition, this model roughly
generates the interactions among the income distribution, credit market imperfection
and segmentation, and economic growth. In fact, these interactions are complex in
the sense that they are simultaneously related. In this model, we more like to keep the
evolution of income distribution as given and focus on the static and some dynamic
e¤ects of inequality on growth. In the one period static study, the so-called informal
credit market is somewhat self responsive by the agents in this economy given the
merely existence of the formal credit market. In the dynamic extensions, the evo-
lution of these two kinds of credit markets are presented. Compared with those of
other existing empirical literature the advantages of the cross-region data within one
country reinforce the challenges from the empirical perspective.
Some future researches are put into agenda. From the theoretical perspective,
several things need further study. An important shortcoming of this model is that
we implicitly assume that each individual household can only enter one kind of credit
markets, either formal or informal. This exclusively entering assumption seems more
reasonable for the segment of the poorest households and the segment of the inter-
mediately richer households. The former really have nothing to serve as collateral
and the latter do not want to bear the high risk in the informal credit market.. But
this exclusive entering assumption seems less reasonable for the other two types of
households (ŵ < wi < ¹w and wi > w): Secondly, we assume that there is no interac-
tion between these two credit markets, i.e. the informal credit market can’t obtain
loan from the formal credit market, or reversely. Thirdly, we need more tractable and
accurate study on the dynamic evolution of the credit market structure along with
the growth of per capita income under the given income distribution. If possible, the
evolution of the income distribution can be endogenized.
From the empirical perspective, section 3 actually puts more weights on testing the
general relationship between initial income distribution and growth than on o¤ering
empirical support on this particular channel of connecting this relationship: the credit
market imperfections and segmentations. Although we include the dummy variable
into the regressions, seriously speaking, this is not su¢cient and only a starting line.
So this kind of more detailed empirical work is needed. There are several proposals
for future. Can we get the empirical positive relationship between the initial income
distribution and the informal credit market share in the whole credit market? Can
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we …nd the appropriate measurement of the degree of credit market imperfections
and test whether the less severer of this problem, the less negative impacts will be by
inequality on growth?
From the policy perspective, one of them is especially worthy noticing: what is the
scienti…c positive evaluation of the informal credit market? In our paper, the informal
credit market will become undesirable from the social e¢ciency point of view under
certain parameters in this model, such as higher ¼; higher q; and lower µ. These either
make the cost of the informal credit market become higher (absolutely undesirable)
or make the incentive constraint loosed in the formal credit market (so make the
informal one relatively undesirable). In fact, for other parameters, the informal one
perhaps has a positive e¤ect. Moreover if the economy is so under-developed and very
poor, i.e. in the so-called risky and miserable era, the informal credit market will be
the only mean to smooth inequality and positively stimulate the total production. So
the policy-makers must be careful when deciding their attitude to the informal credit
market, especially when shaping rural credit policy. As we repeated in section 2, in
order to be good for growth of the rural areas in developing countries, redistributive
policy will be more preferable and can be put into the policy package with less doubt.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proofs of the Model
Proof of Proposition 1
Individual i with initial endowment wi will optimize ki and bichosen in the …rst
sub-period to maximize the overall utility
ln(wi + bi ¡ ki) + ½ ln(yi ¡ rbi) (20)
We simply check the FOCs with respect to kiand bi;respectively
1






wi + bi ¡ ki =
½r
yi ¡ rbi
Using the loan market clearing condition
R 1
0 b
idi = 0; the interest rate r; k (ki ´ k);
and bi can be determined endogenously by these three equations
r = ® ¢ ( 1
½®
+ 1)1¡® (21)
which is the marginal product of capital in equilibrium.







¢ (y¡1 ¡ wi) (23)
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof17:In this case, the problem is
max
ki
ln(wi ¡ ki) + ½ ln yi (24)
17Here we prove it explicitly and directly, rather than through using the tex rate as an indirect












This means that each separated individual has to optimize his investment subject
to his initial wealth endowment and the wealthier is, the more investment will be
undertaken. Simply here bi = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Denote °i as the multiplier. the FOCs are
¡1









b) = 0 (26)
1
wi + bi ¡ ki ¡ ½
r
Fg ¡ rbi
+ °i(¡r + q
r
p
) = 0 (27)
By assumption (2) if bi  0( the lenders ), the constraint 9 must be held with strictly
inequality. So for these i, °i = 0:Otherwise by assumption (3), the constraint will
bind and for these individuals °i > 0: In these two cases plus the condition of the
credit market’s clearing. We just have the same number of equations as the number
of unknowns, °i;k
i; biand r:
When bi = 0;by assumption (2) °i = 0;correspondingly. This individual’s wealth









g = r (29)
But the individuals with wi < ¹w satisfy
F
0
g > r (30)





g ¡ r) + °i[®p(ki)®¡1y1¡®¡1 ¡ r ¡ ®q[y1¡®¡1 + µ](ki)®¡1 +
qr
p
] = 0 (31)
By assumption (3) and °i > 0;we can get F
0
g > r: All the poor facing their binded
incentive constraints have di¤erent investment levels contingent on their wealth levels.
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Proof of Proposition 4
For the individuals with wi > ¹w, it is easy to get from the FOCs of this problem
bi =
Py1¡®¡1 (¹k)
® ¡ ½r(wi ¡ ¹k)
r(1 + ½)
(32)
For the individuals with wi < ¹w;substitute the incentive constraint into the prob-
lem. Find the FOC for optimization of ki;i.e.@(:)
@ki
= 0:Di¤erentiate this equation



















































g) equal to 0 (33)
by assumption (2) and(3), we get the result @k
i
@wi
> 0:To show the second part of























Proof of Proposition 7:
For lenders, the problem is




g = pR (37)
So (1).
For borrowers, the problem is
max ln(wi + li ¡ ki) + ½ ln(Fg ¡ pR
0
l) (38)
There is no constraint for the borrower because of the complete monitoring technology
in the informal credit market. The FOCs give
F
0
g = pR+ ¼l
i (39)








Table 1 Data Description
Variables Obs. Minimum Maximum Mean Std.Deviation
ANNUGROW 29 0.0106 0.0720 0.0484 0.0154
GINI88 29 0.2010 0.3250 0.2640 0.0362
INVEST 29 0.3025 0.4455 0.3872 0.0412
LABGROW 29 -0.0218 0.0287 0.0102 0.0129
EDUCA88 29 4.2632 8.2912 6.4795 0.9418
LNFIXCAP 29 5.7902 8.0942 6.8238 0.5711
EMPLOY88 29 0.0912 0.6300 0.2517 0.1349
LNPOPU88 29 5.6795 9.1203 7.6078 1.0261
DUMMY 29 0.0000 1.0000 0.3679 0.4234
6.3 Figures
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"bad" project is steeper
d (second period consumption)








(The dashed lines are for the perfect market case)
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(The dashed lines are for the perfect market case)
b
Figure 4: Regime 3: Credit Markets Segmentation and Markets Participants
lenders
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meet in informal markets




























Figure 8: No Outlier Driven
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